DORA · ICT operational resilience

DORA ICT Resilience Plan for CASPs: What 2026 Requires

The Digital Operational Resilience Act applies to CASPs in full from January 2025, but the supervisory teeth came out in 2026. Submitting a generic ICT resilience plan now triggers a substantive deficiency notice in most EU member states. The bar has moved.

Server infrastructure — ICT operational resilience

DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) is the EU regulation that imposes ICT risk-management, incident-reporting, third-party-risk-management, and operational-resilience-testing requirements on all financial-services firms — including MiCA-authorised CASPs — on a proportionate basis.

Quick facts

ParameterValue
Legal basisRegulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), in force 17 January 2025
Application to CASPsFull application from MiCA authorisation onwards (Article 2(1)(o))
Proportionality regimeArticle 16 — simplified framework for small firms below thresholds
Required policiesICT risk-management framework, incident-classification procedure, third-party risk policy, business-continuity plan
Required testingAnnual basic resilience testing; advanced TLPT every three years for significant CASPs
Incident-reporting thresholdMajor incidents per RTS — typically >2-hour outage or material data loss
ICT third-party-risk registerMaintained on an ongoing basis; updated for material outsourcing changes

Why does DORA matter more in 2026 than in 2025?

Most EU regulators took a guidance-and-engagement approach in 2025 but shifted to substantive review of ICT resilience plans in early 2026 — files that previously cleared without comment now generate substantive deficiency notices.

DORA entered into force on 17 January 2025, but the first year of supervision was a calibration period for both regulators and firms. Most EU supervisors took a “guidance and engagement” approach in 2025, prioritising firm education over enforcement. That approach changed in early 2026.

In Q1 2026, the Bank of Lithuania, the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority, and the German BaFin all signalled a shift to substantive review of ICT resilience plans. Files submitted in 2025 with template-style plans that cleared without comment now generate substantive deficiency notices on resubmission or annual review.

The supervisory message is consistent: DORA is not a documentation exercise. The plan must reflect actual operating reality, the testing must be performed and documented, the third-party register must be live and current, and the incident-reporting procedure must be exercised at least annually.

What must the ICT resilience plan contain?

The plan covers six mandatory sections — ICT risk-management framework, asset inventory, third-party register, business-continuity plan, incident-management procedure, and testing programme — mapped to the ESAs Joint Final Report on DORA Level 2.

A DORA-compliant ICT resilience plan for a CASP includes the following sections, mapping to the structure required by the ESAs Joint Final Report on DORA Level 2 measures:

1. ICT risk-management framework

  • Documented governance structure for ICT risk
  • Roles and responsibilities of the ICT function, the risk function, and the board
  • Risk-appetite statement covering ICT risk
  • Connection to the firm’s overall risk-management framework

2. ICT asset inventory

  • All hardware and software supporting business operations
  • Classification by criticality (critical / important / non-critical)
  • Mapping of assets to business functions
  • Update cadence for the inventory (typically quarterly)

3. ICT third-party register

  • All ICT third-party providers, including cloud, SaaS, and managed services
  • Classification by criticality
  • Geographic location of services
  • Concentration-risk analysis for the top 5 providers
  • Exit strategy for each critical-or-important provider

4. Business-continuity and disaster-recovery plan

  • Recovery time objectives (RTO) per critical function
  • Recovery point objectives (RPO) per critical data set
  • Backup arrangements and tested restoration procedures
  • Crisis-management governance (who decides what, when)

5. Incident-management procedure

  • Detection and classification of incidents
  • Internal escalation matrix
  • Regulatory reporting timelines (per RTS on incident classification)
  • Customer-communication protocol
  • Post-incident review process

6. Testing programme

  • Annual schedule of basic testing (vulnerability scans, pen tests, tabletop exercises)
  • Three-year cycle of advanced testing (TLPT) for significant firms
  • Independence requirements for testers

The plan is filed at authorisation and reviewed annually thereafter. Material changes to the firm’s operating model or ICT setup trigger an interim update obligation.

Who qualifies for the DORA simplified framework?

Firms below all four thresholds qualify — €100M customer crypto-assets under custody, €15M annual revenue, 25 FTE headcount, and not designated significant by the home regulator.

DORA Article 16 recognises that a small advisory firm with five FTE and no custody activity should not face the same ICT-resilience burden as a Tier 1 bank. The simplified framework applies to firms below the following thresholds:

  • Customer crypto-assets under custody below €100M
  • Annual revenue below €15M
  • Headcount below 25 FTE
  • Not designated as significant by the home regulator

Class 1 advisory firms typically qualify. Most Class 2 exchanges in their first year of operation qualify. Class 3 custodians at meaningful scale typically do not qualify and face the full DORA framework.

The simplified framework reduces:

  • The depth of governance documentation required
  • The frequency and depth of independent testing
  • The granularity of the third-party register

It does not eliminate any obligation. Even simplified-framework firms need an ICT resilience plan, a third-party register, and incident-reporting procedures.

What does DORA require on third-party risk?

DORA Article 28 brings cloud providers, SaaS vendors, and outsourced services into a contractually managed regime requiring audit rights, defined SLAs, exit-assistance clauses, and termination-for-regulatory-reasons rights.

DORA Article 28 brings ICT third-party providers — including cloud, SaaS, and outsourced services — into a contractually managed regime that goes well beyond pre-DORA outsourcing rules. The contractual requirements include:

  • Description of the services and locations of provision
  • Right to audit, including pooled audits with other clients
  • Service-level agreements with explicit performance metrics
  • Exit-assistance clauses
  • Right to terminate for the firm’s regulatory or material risk reasons

Standard hyperscaler contracts often do not include all of these elements out of the box. AWS, GCP, and Azure have each released DORA-aligned addenda for financial-services customers; firms that adopted those addenda before 2025 are largely covered. Firms still on standard commercial terms typically have contractual gaps that supervisors will flag.

How should CASPs handle single-cloud concentration risk?

Pick one of four options — multi-region deployment on the same hyperscaler, active-active multi-cloud, active-passive with documented exit, or board-acknowledged residual risk — and document the choice for the regulator.

A pattern that supervisors are increasingly raising in 2026 is single-cloud concentration risk. Many CASPs run their entire production stack on a single hyperscaler — typically AWS in the EU, often a single AWS region (Frankfurt or Dublin).

DORA Article 29 requires assessment of concentration risk and, where the firm cannot mitigate it, documented acknowledgement of the residual risk. Mitigation options include:

  1. Multi-region deployment. The same hyperscaler, but multiple regions. Cheapest, mitigates regional outages, does not mitigate hyperscaler-level outages.

  2. Active-active multi-cloud. Workload running concurrently on two hyperscalers. Most expensive, mitigates hyperscaler outages, requires architectural complexity.

  3. Active-passive with documented exit. Primary on one hyperscaler, tested ability to fail over to a second. Middle ground.

  4. Documented residual risk. No active mitigation, board-acknowledged residual risk, accepted as part of risk appetite.

In supervisory dialogue, regulators want to see that the firm has explicitly considered the options and made an informed choice. Files with no concentration-risk discussion get a deficiency notice.

How fast must DORA incidents be reported?

Initial notification within four hours of major-incident classification; intermediate report within three working days; final report within one month — the four-hour clock starts at internal classification, not at incident occurrence.

DORA’s incident-reporting regime is materially stricter than pre-DORA arrangements. The clock for major incidents:

  • T+0 (incident classified as major): Internal classification triggers external clock
  • T+4 hours: Initial notification to the home regulator
  • T+3 working days: Intermediate report with diagnostic detail
  • T+1 month: Final report with root cause and remediation

The classification threshold is set in the RTS on incident classification (Commission Delegated Regulation 2024/1772). Major incidents typically include outages exceeding two hours of critical services, material data loss, security breaches affecting customer assets or personal data, and significant financial loss.

The four-hour clock is hard. Firms that have not exercised the procedure in advance routinely miss it on the first real incident. Annual tabletop exercises that simulate the clock are part of the standard DORA testing programme.

What should you look for in counsel on DORA?

Counsel that has personally drafted ICT resilience plans cleared in two or more EU member states without substantive deficiency — DORA expertise is not yet mature in the crypto-asset bar and most generalists treat it as a sub-section.

DORA-specific expertise is not yet mature in the EU crypto-asset bar. Most counsel that handles MiCA CASP files treats DORA as a sub-section of the application rather than a specialism in its own right. This is changing as 2026 supervisory pressure makes DORA the most common deficiency-notice topic.

Counsel that has personally drafted ICT resilience plans that cleared in two or more EU member states without substantive deficiency is meaningfully ahead of the field. The technical content (concentration-risk analysis, third-party register structure, incident-classification thresholds) is the kind of work that benefits from calibration across multiple files.

Pitfalls and nuances

1 Submitting a generic ICT resilience plan templated from the regulator's example

Most EU regulators publish a sample ICT resilience plan structure. Filing a plan that copies the structure verbatim — without populating the firm-specific ICT inventory, third-party register, and concentration-risk analysis — produces a substantive deficiency notice within two weeks of filing. The regulator wants evidence the firm has actually performed the analysis, not a copy of the template.

2 Treating cloud as not-an-outsourcing

Some founders have argued that infrastructure-as-a-service from a hyperscaler is not 'outsourcing' for DORA purposes because the firm retains responsibility for the application layer. Regulators have rejected this. AWS, GCP, and Azure are ICT third-party providers under Article 28 in every supervisory determination we have seen on the public record.

3 Concentration risk on a single hyperscaler

A material number of CASPs run their entire production stack on a single hyperscaler — typically AWS in the EU. DORA Article 29 requires assessment of concentration risk; a single-hyperscaler stack supporting all critical functions is a concentration-risk red flag. Mitigations include multi-region deployment, documented exit strategy, or architectural changes.

4 Outsourced MLRO outside DORA scope

Outsourcing the MLRO function to a specialist provider creates a DORA third-party-risk obligation in addition to the AML obligation. Firms that source the MLRO from an external compliance provider should treat that provider as a critical-or-important ICT third-party and contract accordingly.

5 Annual testing performed by the same internal team year after year

DORA Article 25 requires testing to be performed by 'parties with sufficient knowledge, skills and experience'. Internal IT teams can perform basic testing, but only if they are functionally independent from the system owners. Firms with the same IT team owning and testing the same systems typically fail this independence test.

Frequently asked questions

Does DORA apply to all CASPs, including Class 1?

Yes — DORA applies to all MiCA-authorised CASPs from authorisation, but the depth of compliance scales with firm size and risk profile.

DORA Article 16 introduces a simplified framework for small firms (typically those below €100M in customer crypto-assets and below 25 FTE). Class 1 advisory firms with no custody activity often qualify for the simplified regime. Class 3 custodians at scale do not.

What is the difference between basic and advanced DORA testing?

Basic testing covers vulnerability scanning, penetration testing, and tabletop exercises annually. Advanced testing (TLPT) involves threat-led penetration testing every three years for significant firms.

TLPT — Threat-Led Penetration Testing — is conducted by external testers using realistic threat-actor scenarios. The home regulator designates which CASPs are 'significant' for TLPT purposes; the threshold is typically €500M+ customer crypto-assets or systemic importance.

How fast must an ICT incident be reported?

Initial notification within four hours of classification as a major incident; intermediate report within three working days; final report within one month.

The RTS on incident classification, adopted by the European Commission in 2024, sets concrete materiality thresholds. The four-hour clock starts when the firm classifies the incident as major, not when the incident first occurs.

Are cloud providers covered by DORA's third-party regime?

Yes — cloud providers, including hyperscalers, are covered by the ICT third-party-risk regime under Article 28.

DORA imposes contractual requirements on the firm's relationship with the cloud provider, requires the firm to assess concentration risk where a single cloud provider supports critical services, and gives the firm a right to audit (or pool with other firms for shared audits).

Does using a critical-third-party SaaS for KYC trigger additional DORA obligations?

Yes. KYC SaaS providers supporting authorised CASPs are typically classified as critical-or-important ICT third-party providers, triggering enhanced contractual and monitoring requirements.

The criticality classification depends on whether the provider supports a critical or important function. KYC tooling that gates client onboarding is generally critical-or-important under the EBA outsourcing guidelines that DORA references.

Sources cited

  1. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) — regulation
  2. ESMA, EBA, EIOPA Joint Final Report on DORA Level 2 measures — official document
  3. EBA Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements — regulator
  4. ESAs Joint Q&A on DORA (March 2026) — official document